Complexity and Rationality

In real-world settings; the underlying idealisation is: given premises X (e.g. utility-maximising behaviour), we can demonstrate Y. This is perfectly okay as science goes, but then the scientists often make a REALLY bad turn by implicitly assuming that the real-world conforms to premises X. So they say that every human individual is an utility-maximising creature, and thus the real world will (have to) conform to Y. Of course, humans will often only conform to X every now and then, and they will also conform to A,B,C,... some of which may even interfere with X (see: the hourglass pattern ).

For example, many economists will presuppose that I am trying to get as much value for my money all of the time. Then I give money to charity, and suddenly I am doing this to feel good, to suppress my guilt, or due to another 'rational' explanation, in terms of certain utility-maximising behaviour. In other words, whatever you do it is 'reasoned' in terms of rational choices, which immediately makes the whole term a hollow one; you cannot contradict it, because this type of rationality can no longer be falsified.

Utilitarian rationality is currently a dominant belief in science, but it shares a heritage that goes back to the dawn of Greek philosophy and returns in many guises. Basically, rationality is a belief that truth and (heavenly)order can be found in a certain manner of reasoning, and the mastery of this manner of reasoning will, like the meditative chanting of priests, reveal its mysteries. Logical thinking is another exemplar, and one that has proven to be very powerful; rationality and logic therefore often travel closely together, at least in Western science. For a beautiful account of the mythodological sources of rationality, see Henri Atlan's Enlightenment to Enlightenment .

For the purposes here, we need to see how rationality conforms to our particular epistemological game of PAC, where observers operate with limited knowledge. This already comprimises utilitarian rationality, as has been amply demonstrated in many experiments. If you have to make a choice from a certain set of alternatives, and you cannot make an unambiguous ranking of these alternatives, then the whole system of utility-utilising rationality is compromised, because you will just choose on a hunch. Most choices are made this way, because you have to make a decision in limited means and time, with limited knowledge.This does not unless I contextualise it.